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Abstract
This  study  tests  the  ernpirical  inplications  of  a rnodlfied  screening
model of  lending  [Stiglitz  and Weiss (1-981,  Part  IV) ]  using  a proxy  for
nonrate  credit  conditions  based  on Federal  Reserve  survey  data.  Consistent
with  screening  rnodels,  this  proxy  (1)  signlfieantly  affects  bank  consumer
lending,  (2)  is  significantly  affected  by  the  real  federal  funds  rate  and  ex
ante  default  risk  measures,  and  (3)  substantially  affects  consumer durables.
Other  tesults  indicate  that  deposit  rate  deregulation  has  reduced  the  irnpact
of  monetary  policy  on consuner  credit  availability  and consumer durable
spending.
JEL  Classification  Codes  : E5L, GLL, DLz1.  Introductlon
Ernpirical  studies  of  household  liquidity  or  credit  constraints  generally
fall  into  two  groups.  The first  tests  whether  the  time  series  properties  of
consumer spending  accord  with  the  life-cycle  (LCH) or  pernanent  income  (PIH)
hypotheses  (e.g.,  Hall  (1978), Flavin  (1981), and Wtlcox (1989)).  As l^Iilcox
(1989)  notes,  such  studies  finding  violauions  of  the  LCH/PIH cannot  determine
whether  the  violations  owe to  nyopia,  borrowing  constraints,  or  transactions
costs.  Partly  to  avoid  this  problem,  the  second  stfand  of  research  tests  the
LCH/PIH  using  cross-sectional  data  on consulption  (e.g.,  Hall  and Mishkin
(1982) and Zeldes  (L989))  or  on whether credit  constraints  affect  debt  Ie.9.,
Duca and Rosenuhal (1993),  Jappelli  (l-990) and Cox and Jappelli  (1992)1.
Hortever,  there  have been  few  time  series  tests  of  borrowing  constraints
on consumer  debt.  One exception  is  Fissel  and Jappelli  (1990) who estimate
lhe  share  of  credit  constrained  U.S,  households  across  Llne  using  parameter
estimates  frorn Jappelli's  (1990) cross-section  study.  Fissel  and Jappelli
(1990) note  that  nost  of  the  tirne series  variation  that  they  estimate  reflects
ehanges in  household  denographics  and balance  sheets  because  they  assule  that
credit  standards  prewailing  in  Jappelli's  (1990)  prevailed  throughout  their
sample.  Accordingly,  they  qualify  their  results  by  mentioning  r^rhy  credit
standards  nay  vary  over  time  in  ways  that  they  may not  have  ueasured.
This  gap  in  the  literature  is  significant  for  three  reasons.  First,  it
is  important  to  knorr how much changes  in  lending  policies  affect  household
borrowing  for  monitoring  the  economy and assessing  the  empirical  relevance  of
lending  policy  changes.  Second,  in  evaluating  the  uransmission  channels  of
macro policies,  it  is  irnportant  to  determine  the  inpact  of  policy  on nonrate
credit  conditions.  Third,  in  assessing  the  relevance  of  lheoretical  models  of
credit  constraints,  it  ls  important  to  test  rrhether  lenders  actually  react  tochanges  in  the  eeonomic environment  in  nays  that  are  consistent  with  theory.
This  s  tudy  addresses  each of  these  issues.  Section  2 drar,rs out  testable
irnplications  of  a uodified  Stiglitz  and Weiss (198L, Part  lV)  screening  nodel
of  lending.  Section  3  tests  irnplications  for  r,rhat deteanines  the  availability
of  consumer loans  frorn banks,  while  section  4  tests  implications  for  consumer
loan  growth at  banks.  Section  5 assesses the  inpact  of  nonrate  credit
conditions  on consumer durables  and  the  conclusion  interprets  our  findings.
2,  A  Styllzed  Theoretieal  Mode1 of  Bank Consuner Lendlng
This  sectlon  dewelops  a  stylized  nodel  of  bank  consumer lending  similar
to  the  "  redllning"  /screening  rnodel of  Stiglitz  and Weiss (1981, part  IV).
This  rnodel is  used  to  draw out  testable  implications  about  \uhat determines  che
nonrate  terns  of  bank  consumer credit  and the  volume  of  bank  consuner  lending.
Assue  that  banks  are  risk  neutral  and that  household  j  is  approved  for
a  loan  of  fixed  size  ($1)  if  expected  loan  revenue  (Ej=qjR)  for  some interesr
rate  (r)  at  least  covers the bank's cost of  insured deposits  (d),  i.e.,:
if  Er=qrR >  $  for  sorDe R,  then  household  j  can  qualify  for  a  loan,  (L)
ruhere  R =  (1+r),  q = expected loan  quality  =  (l-x),  x = expected default  rate,
d =  (1+i),  and  i  =  riskless  real  rate.  Further  assume that  the  expected
default  rate  is  inversely  related  to  household j's  expected incorne (Byj):
x'  :  ER/  Py1  ,
where  g  =  a  positive  scaler  reflecting  the  degree  of  rnoral  hazard  effects  for
a  Siven  level  of  (R/Fyj),  yj  =  the  household  specific  component  of  household
j's  expected  income,  F  =  a  positive  index  of  expected  rnacroeconornic  conditions
that  affect  each  household's  expected  income,  and  yi  is  distributed  uniforurly
(2)over  the  interval  [y*',/'*]  .  For  tractability,  also  assrue  that  the
probability  of  applying  for  a  loan  is  constanc  across  income types.
Under  these  assr-rmptions, a household  j  qualifies  for  a  loan  if  EJ:qiR >
{  for  some R,  and competition  ensures  that  each qualifying  income type  faces
different  rninimum loan  rate.  Since  loan  revenue  is  quadraEic  in  R,  two
conditions  must  hold  for  households  having  the  lowest  level  of  income
prospects  (y")  that  can qualify  then  fof  a  loan  at  some loan  rate  factor  (R"):
q"R"  :  d'
a(q"R")/8R':0.
Eq.  (  3a)  ensures zero








profits,  while  eq.  (3b)  reflects  that  the
narginally  qualified  households  peaks  at  R'.
maxirnurn  fatio  of  debt-payments-to-  incone :
P"/  $y')  >  L/2c, (4)
which  is  qualitatively  consistent  with  typical  lending  practices.
Substitution  yields  expressions  for  the  rninirnurn  level  of  qualifying
income and the  share  of  households  that  qualify  (6)  for  a  loan,  respectively:
y'  :  4g$/B,  and
6 -  ly*"-(4e6/P)l/ly^* - y'*l , (6)
where  6,  <  0,  6u )  0,  and  6"  <  0.  The  first  two  derivatives  reflect  that  the
"bindlngness  "  of  a  given  maximuu  debt-palrments-  to-  incone  ratio  endogenously
depends  on  real  rates  and  general  macroeconomic  conditions.  6"  reflects  the
extent  to  which  a  change  in  other  factors  not  reflected  in  teaL  rnarket
interest  rates  or  in  incorne  affects  credit  standards  and  availabilitv.+
The degree  to  which  credit  avaiLability  affects  bank  consumer lending
also  depends on  loan  demand.  Tf  the  probability  of  applying  for  a  loan  by
household  i  can be  expressed  by  t(6,a),  where  fa(0  and  fr>0,  then  the  volume
of  lending  reflects  lhe  denand of  households  who are  not  credit  constrained:
L"  - o1y*--y-lr(p,6),
aL/ad  - -laet/Fl + fr6  [y*-y'*]  < 0,
aL^/aP  :  beft/F'l  + fr6 [y*"-y'i"]  )  0,  and





since  fr<  0 and f,  )  0.  L"" (  0 because a rise  ing  induces a tightening  of
credit  standards.  Changes in  the  macroeconomic outlook  (B)  and real  interest
rates  ({)  hawe similarly  signed  supply  and denand effects  on  loan  volume.  For
example,  the  second  term  of  (8)  is  negatiwe  reflecting  that  loan  dernand  falls
as  loan  rates  rise  and the  first  term  is  negative  since  fewer  households  could
qualify  for  a loan  as real  rates  rise.  In  equation  (9),  the  first  term  is
posiEi.ve  because more households  could  quaLify  for  a  loan  and the  second  term
is  positive  since  loan  dernand  rises  as  the  macroeconomic outlook  improves.
Thus,  macroeconornic variables  typically  included  in  constuner loan  regressions
will  also  pick  up  at  least  some of  the  effects changed  credit  availabil  i ty.
a  credit  availability  proxy It  follows  that  the  uarsinal  infornation
of
in
(CR)  for  explaining  bank  consuner  loans  depends  eritically  on  how  much  changes
in  CR (1)  reflect  changes  in  rnoral  hazard  problens  in  lending  (Ag),  and  (2)
respond  differently  to  changes  in  interest  rates  or  cyclical  conditions  than
do  changes  in  the  demand  for  durables.  In  practice,  the  first  category  could
reflect  changes  in  bankruplcy  laws  or  the  perceived  moral  hazard  posed  by
lending  to  households,  and  che  second  could  include  changes  in  credit)
availability  stenming  froro  the  bindingness  of  Reg Q ceilings  whose correlation
with  interest  rates  has  changed dramatically  since  deposit  deregulation.
In  terms of  lestable  empirical  hypotheses,  eqs.  (7),  (9),  and (10)  inply
that  a variable  which  is  positively  related  to  nonrate  terms  of  bank  consuner
loans  should  hawe a posilive  correlation  with  the  wolune  of  bank  consumer
lending.  In  addition,  eq.  (5)  irnplies  that  such  an  increasing  neasure  of  bank
credit  availabiLity  should  increase  (i.e.,  y" falls)  as the  real  interest  rate
({)  falls  and as  the  macroeconomic outlook  (B)  irnproves.  Alternatively,  the
standard  portrayal  of  che money nultiplier  process  also  suggests  that  real  M2
growth  at  banks  could  be  a rnajor  detenninant  of  credit  standards  at  banks.r
3.  An Empirieal  Model  of  Nonrate  Credlt  Conditions  at  Banks
This  section  presents  a proxy  for  nonrate  credit  conditions  at  banks,
and then  discusses  its  potential  deterninants.  Next,  data  used  in  roodeling
this  proxy  are  presented,  and then  regression  results  are  reviewed.
3.A.  A Proxy  for  Nonrate  Credlt  Conditions  at  Banks
To rneasure nonrate  credit  conditions,  an  index  of  the  change  ln  bank
willingness  to  nake  consumer installment  loans  is  created  based  on the  Federal
Reserve's  Quarterly  Survey  of  Bank Lending  Terrns, which  asked  since  1966:Q3:
"How has  your  bank's  willingness  to  make consumer installment  loans
changed relative  to  3-nonths  ago?"
(a)  rnuch more,  (b)  somewhat rnore,  (c)  about  unchanged,
(d)  somewhat  less,  or  (e)  rnuch  less.
A  diffusion  index  (CR) of  the  average  response  was constructed  by  weighing
responses  of  "much more"  by  2,  "somewhat nore"  by  1,  "unchanged"  by  0,




good  daua  on  ex
imply  a  role  for  relative  ex  ante  returns
ante  returns  are  unawailable.o
expanded  credit  availability  and  negative  values,  the  converse.  In  general,
the  wlll  ingnes s  -to-lend  index  declines  prior  to  recessions  (Figure  1),
Because  CR tracks  xt.e  reTative  change  in  willingness  to  make  loans,  it
is  appropriate  to  use  an  equation  for  the  reTative  change  in  bank  credit
standards  to  derive  a  testable  ernpirical  model  of  the  wariable  CR.  In  (5),
the  tern  y'can  be  loosely  interpreted  as  a  credit  standard  where  a  higher
level  of  y" corresponds  xo  a  tougher  credit  standard.  Thus,  eq.  (5)  implies:
^los(y") :  alog(g) + Alos({) - alog(p),
cR:  hIAlog(g), AIog(d), AIog(B)],
': Untll  1979,  banks  were  asked  about
their  credit  standards  on business  loans
questions  hawe a  significant  correlation
and
hor.r their  willingness  to  nake  and
had  changed.  Indexes  fron  these
of  -.88  fSchreft  and Owen  (f99f)].
(  11)
(L2)
where  horo","1  and ho.o"161  (  0,  and h'os(r) >  0.  Since  CR i-s inversely  related  to
Alog(y"),  (11)  implies  that  CR  decllnes  with  an increase  in  the  real  riskless
rate  (Alog(C)>0 or  a tightening  of  nonetary  policy),  but  rises  on signs  of  a
better  economic outlook  (Afog(B)>0,  irnplying  less  nacroecononic  default  risk).
One problen  is  the  arnb  lguity  of  the  survey  question  used  to  construct
CR.  If  banks  are  nore  willing  to  1end,  (i)  hawe they  have  eased ctedit
standards,  (ii)  do more households meet a fixed  credit  standard,  or  (iii)  are
banks  accommodating an  increase  in  loan  dernand?  Possibility  (iii)  is
ineonsistent  with  two  facts,  First,  less  ambiguous questions  about  business
lending  suggest  that  the  index  measures changes in  consr-rmer  credit  standards.2
Second, Granger test  results  below favor  explanations  (i)  and (if).
3.8.  Uodel SDecifLcatlon  and Dara
Several  regressions  were run.  Parall-eling  (12),  each includes  a measure













































































for  Reg Q [Jaffee  and Rosen (1978)]  and other  regulatory  effects.
Real Rates  and Monetaty  Policy  Indicators
Four  monetary  policy  indicators  were  tried.  One proxies  the  change in
real  bank  funding  costs  with  the  change in  the  real  federal  funds  rate  (ARFF),
which  outperformed  the  change in  the  real  l-year  T-bl1-1 rate.  AnoLher  is  the
t\ro-quarter  growth  rate  of  real  M2 balances  at  banks  (GM22).3  Both  variables
measure  inflation  expectations  using  the  annualized  two-quarter  percentage
change in  the  implicit  consurnption  price  deflator.  Two other  indicators  of
xhe change in  monetary  policy  that  Ire use  are  t]ne change in  the  spread  betrreen
the  six-nonth  prime  conmercial  paper  and Treasury  bill  rates  (APAPERSILL)
[Bernanke  (1990)  and Friedman  and Kuttner  (L992)]  and  the  change in  lhe  slope
of  the  yield  curve,  defined  as  the  spread  between  the  L0-year  and 3-nonth
Treasury  rates  (AYCURVE)  lstock  and Watson  (1989)].  AFF and   PAPERBILL  should
be negatively  correlated  with  the  change in  bank willingness  to  make consumer
Ioans,  while  GM2  and AYCURVE  should  be  positively  correlated  with  the  index.
DefauTt  Risk
Default  risk  is  measured  by  the  percentage  change  in  the  quarterly
average  level  of  the  index  of  leading  economic  indicators  (GLI).  Because  this
index  leads  the  business  cycle,  GLI  should  be  positively  correlated  with  the
future  ability  of  households  to  service  new  debts  and  therefore,  with  CR.4
3 The tr,/o-quarter  gronrth rate  outperformed  the  one-quarter  gror,rLh  rate.
The first  difference  of  GttI2Z  also  proved  inferior  to  c1422.
n An alternative  credit  risk  measure,  the  change in  the  spread  between A-
and AAA-rated  corporate  bond yields,  was insignificant  in  other  runs,  likely
because  it  reflects  the  risk  of  firms  more than  that  of  households.  The
changes  in  the  unenployment  and the  consumer loau  delinquency  rate  were  also
tried.  Although  these  wariables  are  more specific  to  households  than  cLI ,
they  lat  the  business  cycle  and are  not  be  good indicators  of  ex  ante  default
risk.  This  likely  explains  why GLI  proved  superior  to  these  alternatives.I
ReguTatory  Factors
To control  for  Reg Q induced  dis interroediauion,  a variable  (REGQ)  was
included  that  equaled  the  spread  of  a rnarket  rate  over  a  deposit  rate  ceiling.
Measuring  these  effects  raises  the  issues  of  which  deposit  rate  to  use  and how
to  handle  market-rate  based  deposits  introduced  before  the  lifting  of  most
deposit  rate  ceilings  in  1983.  REGQ  was based  on regulations  on  srnall  tirne-
Iike  deposits,  because  their  naturity  is  closer  to  that  of  auto  loans  than
that  of  demand or  passbook  savings  deposits,  and because  nost  market-rate
based  instruments  were  designed  to  substitute  for  small  tlrne  deposits.  REGQ
equals  the  maximum  of  zero  or  the  spread  between  the  3-year  Treasury  yield  and
the  ceilint  on 3-year  srnall tiroe rates  up through  I978:Q2.  Frorn  1978:Q3-
81-:Q3,  rate  ceilings  on small  saver  certificates  were used  fsee Mahoney, et
aL  (1987) and Duca (1995a, 1995b)1, and REGQ  equaled 0 after  1981:Q3.5
Another  deregulatory  action  was the  introduction  of  MMDAs  in  late-L982,
which  enabled  banks  co  offer  a  close  substitute  for  monev market  rnutual  funds
(MMMFs).  As  a  result,  households  shifced  funds  into  Uf,fOa"  p.ttfy  from  MMMFS,
5lhis  rneasure outperforned  others  based  on either  6-month  small  tirne
deposit  or  noney market certificate  (MMC)  bank regulations.  IQualitative
results  wete similar  using  MMC  regulations.l  Ower 1979:Q3-Q4,  bank SSC
ceilings  equaled  xt.e 2-1,/2 year  Treasury  yield  minus  25 basis  points.  In
January  and February  1980,  this  spread  was widened  to  75 basis  points.  From
March  to  April  1980,  SSC  ceilings  equaled  the  2-L/2  year  Treasury  yield  minus
25 basis  points  up to  12 percent.  Fron June L980 to  July  1981, SSC  ceilings
equaled  Ehe 2-L/2  year  Treasury  yield  rninus 50 basis  points  when this  yield
was between 9.5  and 12.0 percent,  9.5  percent  when this  yield  was below 9.5
percent,  and 12.0 percent  when this  yield  exceeded 12.0 percent.
The l-ifting  of  ceilings  on uninsured  large  time  deposits  in  1973 was of
Iinited  help  in  allevlating  Reg Q effects  for  two  reasons.  First,  back  in  the
L970s,  it  was difficult  for  srnaller,  less  well-knom  banks  and thrifts  to
issue  urrinsured  deposits.  Second, when rate  ceilings  r.lere binding  on  insured
deposits,  banks  flooded  the  market  with  uninsured  CDs in  periods  when monetary
tlghtening  boosted  default  risk.  As  a  result,  the  risk  premium that  investors
denanded on  large  CDs typically  soared  above  the  then  normal  premiurn of  50
basis  points  above Treasury  rates.  For  exarnple,  when the  funds  rate  peaked  in
Jrly  1974,  six-month  CD-T-bill  rate  spread  ,,tas 402 basis  points.9
the  supply  of  funds  to  banks  rose,  and banks  increased  their  willingness  to
make consumer loans  (Senior  Loan Officer  Opinion  Survey,  May 1983).  A dunrny
(MMDA)  equal  to  l- in  1982:Q4 was included  to  control  for  this  re interrnediation
effect.  Another  duflny  (coNTRoL) was included  for  the  imposition  and  lifting
of  credit  controls  in  1-980:Q2  (:  l)  and 1980:Q3(: -1),  respectlvely,  which
caused a  tenporary  plunge  followed  by  a  temporary  j urnp in  CR.
3,C.  Granger Test  Results
Granger  tests  were  done to  assess  whether  bankers  were  confusing  loan
dernand r,zi  th  loan  supply  in  responding  to  the  survey.  If  banks  confused  loan
dernand ruith  supply,  then  CR should  nove  with  or  lag  behind  changes  in  the
growth  of  real  credit  extensions  and real  consurDer  durable  spending.  However,
Granger  tests  indicate  that  CR laads  both  variables  (table  1).  Granger  tests
also  show that  CR leads  changes in  the  real  federal  funds  rate  and  the  growth
rate  of  real  M2,  but  suggest  that  CR moves contemporaneous  ly  with  the  paper-
bill  spread  and changes  in  the  index  of  leading  economic  indicators.  The
results  for  M2 may reflect  that  M2 responds  with  a  lagged  response  to  changes
in  its  opportunity  cost,  consistent  with  evidence  that  ARFF leads  GM22 fand
Alog(M2)1.  Tests  also  indicate  that  changes in  the  slope  of  the  yield  curve
Iead  CR.  0n balance,  cranger  tests  inply  that  changes  in  the  willingness-to-
lend  index  reflect  changes in  loan  policy  (supply)  more lhan  Ioan  dernand.
3,D.  Results  Frour llodeling  the  llill  ingnes s-To-Lend  Index
Models  1-4  in  table  2  include  all  three  regulatory  terrns,  the  ex  ante
default  risk  proxy,  and one real  rate  or  monetary  policy  variable.  Models  5
and  6  include  ARFF and  either  AYCURVE  or  APAPERBILL.  Each rnodel  has  an  R'?  of
around  .80  and  several  patterns  energed.  The default  risk  and regulatory
variables  were  significant  with  the  expected  signs,  with  a  large  coefficienu10
on CoNTROL.  The REGQ  results  irnply that  the  lifting  of  Reg Q has reduced, but
not  eliminated,  the  inpact  of  monetafy  policy  on nonrate  credit  terms.
Each nonetary  pol"icy  wariable  lras  significant  with  the  expected  sign.
Of  the  models  using  one monetary  variable,  uhat  using  AYCURVE  had  the  highest
R'?, followed  in  order  by  ARFF, APAPERBILL, and,  GYt22.  ARFF is  significant  in
the  presence  of  APAPERBILL  aud AYCURVE. Howewer, uodel  4,  whLch uses  AYCURVE,
does not  track  the  1-ending index  weII  in  the  early-1990s.
Moreover,  unlike  ARFF  and GM22, AYCURVE  and APAPERBILL  have  statistic-
ally  different  effects  after  the  1970s as  shown by  variables  interacting  then
with  a  duIluly equal  to  l- after  1978  (table  3)  whether  or  not  REGQ  is  present.
This  likely  reflects  a  shift  in  the  indicator  properties  of  the  spread
wariables.6  By contrast,  only  when REGQ  is  onitted  does ARFF  hawe a
significantly  smaller  effect  after  the  1970s,  implying  that  interest  rates
affect  constrmer credit  availability  less  after  deposit  deregulation.
In  the  late  1980s and early  1990s the  willingness-lo-lend  index  turned
down afuer  a  long  period  of  positive  readings  (Figure  2),  but  did  not  fall  as
nuch  as  it  had  in  previous  periods  that  have been described  as  credit  crunches
(L974-75 and 1979-82).'  Regression results  using  the  real  federal  funds rate
imply  that  uhe absence of  Reg Q effects  likely  accounts  for  this  difference.
6 These findings  are  consi.stent  with  evidence  of  shifts  in  the  relation-
ship  between  the  yield  curve  and  inflation  [Balke  and Enery  (1994b)],  the
yield  curve  and output  lBalke  and Ernery (1994a,  footnote  7)],  and  the  paper-
bilL  spread  and output  [Hafer  and Kutan  (]-992)  and Emery (  forthcorning)  I .
The effect  of  Gl,l22  is  not  different  after  the  1970s,  reflecting  that
irnplicitly  by  construction,  M2 growth  picks  up Reg Q effects.
? The surveys  also  showed that  many banks  tightened  their  credit  stan-
dards  on C&I and cornmercial  real  estate  loans  over  L990-91,  perhaps  oTring to
ower-borrowing  by  firms  and overbuilding,  with  surveys  showlng  that  C&I loan
standards  were  tightened  less  than  during  the  t974-75  and,  !979-82  episodes.11
4.  Uodellng  Consumer Loan Growth  at  Banks
This  section  tests  I,rhether a noninterest  rate  proxy  for  credit
availability  affects  bank  consumer lending.  First,  an eropirical  model  is
presented.  Next,  the  data  are  described,  and  lhen  results  are  presented,
Before  proceeding,  it  is  inportant  to  note  that  several  factors  make it
is  easier  to  assess  the  imDact  of  credit  constraints  on bank  consumer Loans
than  on olher  loans.  First,  one can directly  adjust  bank  consumer loans  for
securitizations  ,  which  remove loans  from  bank balance  sheets  (see  Duca and
Carrett  (L992));  by  contrast,  it  is  nore  difficult  to  adjust  bank conmercial
and  industrial  (C&I)  or  real  estate  loans  for  loan  sales.  Second,  tax  reform
effects  on consunel  loans  are  more transparent  and easier  to  rnodel than  those
affecting  business  or  real  estate  finance.  Third,  data  on auto  loan  rates  at
banks  and finance  companies provide  a  good measure of  nonbank competition  that
is  not  plagued  by  tern  structure  problems  posed,  for  example,  by  substitution
actoss  C&I  loans,  cornmercial  paper,  and bonds.  Fourth,  consumer lending  were
not  affected  by  special  factors  such  as  those  affecting  C&I loans  (mergers  in
the  1980's)  or  real  estate  lending  (the  thrift  crisis).  Finally,  surveys  can
be  used  to  construct  a  conti"nuous  credit  availability  series  tha!  goes back  !o
the  late  1960s for  consumer loans.  but  not  for  C&I or  real  estate  loans.
4,A,  Emplrlcal  Spec  lficarion
This  sub-section  lays  out  a  sirnple  nodel  of  bank  consumer
can control  for  nonbank competition,  nonrate  credit  terms,  and
a1l  conslrmer loans.  The stock  of  real  bank  consurner loans  (Lb)
loans  which
the  deoand  for
is  given  by:
Lb  :  @bQNf  , (13)
where  oo =  bank  share  of  consumer  loans,  Q =  population  share  qualifying  for12
Ioan  large  enough that  households  borrow,  lrl =  population,  and Lt =  real
notional  consumer loan  dernand  per  capita.  Superscripts  b  and t  denote  bank
and all  lender  variables,  respectively.  A rise  ln  CR lmplies  that  more
households  can borrow  against  their  permanent  income or  that  Q is  higher.  CR,
which  proxies  for  the  percent  change in  credit  standards,  can be  seen as  a
determinant  of  how quickly  the  overall  stock  of  loans  adJusts  tovrards  the
Ievel  desired  by  households  based  on pernanent  income and  interest  rates.
Under this  interpretation,  eq.  (13)  inplies  the  error  correction  model:
A1"  :  [c"  .+ Er.,  orCR.-r]ECE-1+  Aabr +  Aqr  +  Ant  +  A(proxy  for  1'"), (  14)
whete  lor,rer case  letters  denote  Logs,  A  is  the  fitst  difference  operator,  and
EC =(lb-lb.)  is  an errot  correction  terxn reflecling  the  long-run  relationship
betrteen  lb  and factors  affecting  loan  market  share  (ob)  and dernand (I").3
The Lnteractive  variable  [CR*EC],  tests  to  see whether  relative  changes
in  credit  avallability  can  affect  the  speed of  adjustnent.  Recall  that  the
error  correction  tenn  is  based  on the  Long-run  relationship  between  the  logs
of  loans  and  income,  along  with  the  gap betTreen bank  and  finance  company auto
loan  rates.  Thus,  the  error  correction  terD  equals  the  log  of  the  ratio  of
the  actual  co  the  log  of  the  long-run  equilibrium  level  of  loans.  As  a
result,  a  tern  lnteracting  CR and  the  error-correction  terD  can be  interpreted
as  reflecting  how short-run  changes  in  credit  availability  can  lead  to  short-
run  changes  in  how rnuch  households  are  using  leverage.
4.  B.  Data and Variables
The dependent  variable  is  the  growth  rate  of  real  bank  consumer loans,
adjusted  for  securitizations  (Federal  Reserve  data)  and  deflated  by  the  PCE
s Population  was excluded  because  changes  in  it  occur  too  gradually.deflator.  Independent  wariables
tax,  spending  and  labor,  nonbank
Real  User  Cost  of  Capital
The  real  user  cost  of  bank
13
are of  five  types:  user
conpetition,  and nonrate
cost  of  capital,
credit  conditions.
consurner loans  (r)  can be rneasured by:
(ls)
where  R =  nomlnal  interest  raxe,  t  = marginal  income tax  rate,  n  a  percent  of
consumer loan  interest  that  is  deduccible,  and ?re  =  expected  inflation.  The
four-quarter  percent  change ln  the  PCE  deflator  is  used  to  proxy  n".e  The
most  conmon 48-nonth  rate  on bank  loans  for  new autos  (Fed data)  is  used
because  (a)  auto  Ioans  comprise  40*  of  consumer borrowing,  (b)  credit  card
debt  appears  to  be  very  interest  insensitive  and credit  card  rates  ate  \reTy
sticky  (Ausubel  (1991)),  and (c)  much  credit  card  debt  is  float  (i.e.,
convenience  card  use).10  The auto  loan  rate  is  adjusted  for  a break  in  1983
when  the  loan  xlaturity  changed  frorn  3  to  4  years  by  assuming  that  each  year  of
loan  maturity  adds  roughly  one percentage  point  based  on  anecdotal  ewidence.
The tax  rate  used was the  U.S.  Treasury's  series  on  the  marginal  incone  tax
rate  for  a  farnily  of  four  earning  the  median  level  of  incorne (Lerman  (1991)).
The share  of  deductible  consumer loan  interesc  (O)  equaled  1 up  through
1986:Q4,  and since  then,  the  four-year  ahead expectation  of  the  average  pre-
announced share  of  interest  that  is  deductible,  adjusted  for  anortization.ll
'  This  deflator  yielded  better  results  than  the  CPI or  core  CPL
'o Despite  high  real  loan  rates,  credi!  card  debt  grew rapidly  in  the
1980s.  Other  runs  using  the  most  corulon credit  card  rate  and  the  one-year  T-
bill  rate  yielded  much ruorse Fs  and did  not  affect  the  qualitative  results.
11  The percent  of  consumer loan  interest  that  could  be  deducted  r,ras 65*
for  L987, 40*  for  1988, 20t  for  l-989, lOt  for  1990, and 0 thereafter.  The
four-year  horizon  xnatches the  rnaturity  of  the  bank  auto  loan  rate  series.
r  -  R(l-tO)  -  ?re,L4
VariabTes  ControTTing  for  Other  Tax  Effects  on  Bank  Consuner  Loans
Aside  frorn changing  lhe  after-tax  real  rate  via  altering  interest
deductibility,  the  Tax Reform Act  of  1986 also  changed refative  cost  of
consulDer loans  versus  other  finance,  inducing  many to  pay  off  consurner debt
with  inueres t-deductible  horne  equity  lines  of  credit  (HELCs).  To control  for
this  substitution  effect,  several  dunmy variables  were  tested  including  a
dummy  equal  to  I  since  f986  (REFDIJM),  a  dummy  egual  to  L  in  the  transitional
quarters  of  1986:4 and 1987:1,  and a dumny  equal  to  I  in  the  transitional
quarter  of  L981  :L.  All  of  these  tax  reform  duuunies  were  insignificant  and did
not  affect  the  qualitatiwe  results  in  the  error-correction  models  tested,  and
are  not  in  any  of  the  models  that  are  reported  in  che  tables  or  charts.lz
Consumer Spending  and Unenp  Toyment
Several  other  variables  were  included  that  are  typically  associated  with
Ioan  demand,  Because loans  reflect  a  deriwed  demand for  durable  purchases,
the  Federal  Reserve  Board  model's  proxy  for  permanent  incone  (CON) was
included  to  control  for  the  underlying  demand for  durables.  Other  demand
effects  were  controlled  for  with  the  change in  the  unemploynent  rate  (AU).13
ControTTing  for  Substitution  Between Bank and NonBank Consumer Loans
Auto  loan  rates  at  banks  greatly  exceeded those  at  finance  companies
until  the  late-1970s.  Following  the  introduction  of  market-rate  based  deposit
instruments  in  the  early-1980s,  this  spread  narrowed  as banks  passed  on  the
'2  Sone  of  these  durnmies were  significant  in  other  nodels  that  dld  not
include  long-run  relationships.  Most  households  with  HELCS initially  used
then  !o  retire  eonsumer debt  [see  Canner,  Luckett,  and  Durkin  (1989),  p.  337].
IrCON =  consulption  of  services  and  nondurables  plus  the  imputed  service
flow  frorn  the  stock  of  durables.  CON awoids  much  of  the  simultaneity  between
durable  speuding  and  loans.  Loan  supply  effects  of  CON are  likely  picked  up
by  CR,  implying  that  any  marginal  information  in  CON reflects  loan  dernand.l5
higher  deposit  rates  and banks lost  auto  loan  rnarket share  [Duca (1991)].
Since  then,  the  captive  finance  companies hawe irregularly  offered  incentives
which  induced  shifts  toward  auto  finance  coupany loans  [Duca  (1991)].  To
parsinoniously  control  for  these  effects,  we use  the  spread  between  finance
and bank  auto  loan  rates  for  nerr cars  (SPREAD).  A bigger  spread  should  raise
bank  loan  rnarket  share  (ao)  and bank  consurner loan  growth,  (Af').*
Non-Rate Cred.it  Condit ions / Avai Lab  i7 itv  VariabTes
Two variables  were  used  to  control  for  the  effects  of  variation  in  non-
rate  credit  conditions/availab  il  ity.  The first  is  CR.  Thls  index,  however,
is  more tlghtly  linked  to  the  gror,/th rate  of  real  consumer Ioan  extensions
than  to  the  growth  of  consumer loan  outstandings,  owing  to  aoortization,
principal  payments  are  back-loaded  over  a  loan's  life,  and loan  outstanding
growth  tends  to  lag  loan  extension  growth  by  about  one year.  Unfortunately,
extensions  data  end in  1982:Q4, necessitatlng  the  use of  outstandings.
We tested  the  one-quarter  lag  of  CR  as a separate  r.h.s.  wariable  and in
lhe  form  of  an  interactive  variable  that  equaled  the  one-quarter  lag  of  CR
multiplied  by  the  error-correctlon  tern.  The CR  wariables  control  for  two
effects.  First,  they  reflect  credit  standards  at  banks  and perhaps  at
nonbanks.  For  this  reason,  an  increase  in  CR  rsil1  likely  accornpany faster
loan  gtowth  [higher  Alb  in  eq.  (2)]  beeause  the  share  of  households  that  can
qualify  for  a loan  rises  (Aq is  higher).  Second, a rise  in  CR  may lead  to
banks  gaining  market  share  from  finance  companies  [see  Duca (1991)].  One
reason  for  thls  is  that  banks  had  tlghtened  credit  standards  when binding  Reg
1a The  finance  conpany  rate  is  an  average  on  all  loans,  while  the  bank
rate  is  for  a  fixed  naturity  (3  years  before  1983 and  4  years  afterward).  (Fed
data).  SPREAD  was  adjusted  for  maturity  differences  by  assuming  that  each
extra  year  of  loan  maturity  boosts  loan  rates  by  one  percentage  point.L6
Q ceilings  caused  deposiE  outflows  while  finance  companies continued  raising
funds  by  issuing  conmercial  paper.
Another  reason  a  rise  in  CR boosts  bank rnarket  share  is  related  to  the
lendet  of  last  resort  role  of  captive  finance  cornpanies,  r,rhere Loan delin-
quency  rates  tend  to  be higher.  Captives  lend  to  some who are  denied  credit
at  banks  because part  of  the  profit  earned  on  a  car  sale  exceeds  the  negative
expected  return  from  lending  to  a poor  credit  risk.  When  banks  tighten  their
credit  standards,  they  iDprove  the  average  loan  quality  of  people  denied  bank
Loans,  thereby  inducing  finance  companies to  tighten  their  credit  standards
less  than  banks  do.  As  a  result,  a  fall  in  CR  rnay also  be  correlated  with
falls  in  Aol and Alb  as banks  lose  market  share  to  finance  conpanies.
The second credit  availability  variable  accounts  for  the  consuner  credit
controls  of  1980:Q2 and their  lingering  effect  in  1"980:Q3. These controls
induced  banks  to  tighten  their  credit  standards  on credit  cards.  Although  the
controls  exempted auto  credit,  they  lowered  banks'  auto  loan  market  share  for
two reasons  Isee Duca (1991)].  First,  many  consulers  believed  that  it  was
iIIegaI  to  borrow  and may not  have  borrowed  untiL  they  met  dealers  r^rho  could
originate  loans.  Second, many consumers may not  hawe applied  for  bank  loans
fearing  that  they  would  be  rejected.  To distinguish  this  effect  from  other
factors  affecting  credit  availability,  a  duu[oy  variable  (DftM802)  was included
that  equals  1  in  1980:Q2 and  that  is  expected  to  hawe a negative  sign.
4.  C, Results
A  two-step  error-correction  model  of  consumer loans  was developed.  In
the  first  step,  a  cointegrating  vector  \sas estlmated  (with  a  trend)  using  the
Johansen and Juselius  procedure  to  find  a  long-run  relatlonship  between  the
log  of  real  consumer loans,  the  log  of  perrnanent income  (CON), and the  gapL7
between  finance  company  and  bank  loan  rates  (SPREAD).15  The  resulting  vector
shows  that  lb  is  positiwely  related  to  log(CON)  and  SPREAD  over  the  long-run.
From  this  cointegrating  vector,  an  error  correction  tenn  (EC)  was
defined  and  used  to  estixlate  second  stage  model  versions  of  equation  (14):
Alb" -  [c"  +  erCR._1]EC"_1  + P\zc_j +  ll^lbr_1 +.\r^lbr-r, (L6)
where  z  =  a vector  of  short-run  wariables,  including  Alog(CON),_,,  A(SPREAD).,1,
rr-1,  DuM802c,  and  A(U)r-1,  where  U:  the  unemplo)-rrent  rate.  [Other  lags  of
these  variables  were  insignificant.  ]  Except  for  models  L,  3  and  5,  which
exclude  DUM802,  the  nodels  in  table  4  include  the  same z  and  EC terms,  but
differ  in  whether  CR is  added  as  separate  r.h.s.  term  or  is  lnteracted  with
the  EC terrn  to  see  if  credit  availability  is  positively  correlated  with  the
speed  of  error-correction.  Since  loan  data  start  in  1973:Ql  and  2  lags  of  Alb
are  included  as  regressors,  the  sarnple was L973:3-94:4.
ECr,1 and  A(U)t-l  are  significant  in  every  model  with  the  anticipated
signs,  while  the  rate  term  r  r^ras ins ignificant  .16  Note  that  while  the  short-
run  terns  A(SPREAD)E_L  and A(log(CoN))",  are  insignificant,  the  significance  of
15 The  real  after-tax  loan  rate  is  stationary  and  is  thus  not  included,
0n1y  when  SPREAD  r,ras included  could  a  significant  cointegrating  vector  be
found,  reflecting  Lhe  decline  in  bank's  auto  loan  market  share  in  the  late-
1970s  and  early-1980s  when  bank  loan  rates  rose  toward  finance  conpany  rates.
16 EC should  have  a  negatiwe  sign  as  EC= lb  -  lb's  equilibrium  level.  In
other  runs,  r  was  replaced  with  log(r)  and  Ar.  These  allernatives  ruere  also
insignificant  and  did  not  affect  the  qualiuative  results.  r  was  significant
in  one-stage  error  correction  nodels  that,  in  place  of  the  EC tern  in  the  ttwo-
stage  models,  included  the  one-quarter  lags  of  log(L),  1og(CON),  SPREAD,  and
r.  In  some one-stage  nodels,  CR was  added  as  a  separate  r.h,s.  variable  or
was  interacLed  with  Iog(L).  Slnce  the  qualitatiwe  results  with  respect  to  CR
were  similar  co  those  in  the  tables,  the  more  elegant  two-stage  results  are
presented.  In  other  runs,  the  percent  change  in  consumer  confidence  (CoNFID)
was  insignificant,  irnplying  that  confidence  dld  not  add  inforrnation  in  the
presence  of  other  dernand-related  variables.18
Iog(CON).-, and SPREAD.-,  in  the  cointe gx^xing  vector  inplies  that  incone  and
the  degree  of  nonbank coupetition  are  significant  long-run  determinants  of
bank  lending.  DIJM802  is  significant  when included,  and  its  absence  in  models
3 and  5 has  little  effect  on  the  significance  of  CR.  The terms  interacting  EC
with  lags  of  CR in  models  3 and 4  are  jointly  significant.  Because the  EC
term  is  expected  to  have  a negative  sign,  the  negative  signs  of  CR*EC  in  those
rnodels irnply  that  greater  credit  availability  speeds up  the  adjustnent  of  bank
loans  to  their  long-run  equilibriurn  and encourages  people  to  lever  up  in  the
short-run.  Furthermore,  in  rnodels that  include  the  significant  credit  control
duumy (nodels  2,4,  and 6,),  thete  is  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  of  the
noncR model  (2)  but  not  in  nodels  4  and 6  that  include  the  interactive  CR term
and CR, respectively.  0n balance,  these  findings  iurply  that  the  growth  rate
of  bank  consuner  loans  reflects  both  nonprice  and price  terns.17
Using an insa-uple period  of  L973:3-87:4,  ex post  forecasts  frorn the
table  4  models r,rere done over  1988:Q1-94:Q4  (the  most  recent  interest  rate
cycle)  using  an insample period  of  L973:Q2-87:Q4.  Comparing  across models
with  or  without  the  credit  control  durnrny,  the  S.S.E.  of  the  forecasts  frorn  the
nonoR models  (models  I  and 2,  respectively)  were  28 percent  higher  than  those
from  the  uodels  with  the  interactive  CR term  (rnodels 3  and 4,  respectively)
and 29 percent  higher  than  those  from  the  nodels  with  CR (models  5  and 6).
5.  Consuner Spendlng  Effects
To assess  the  impact  of  nonrate  credit  terns  on consrrDer spending,  the
credit  awailability  index  (CR)  is  added to  several  equations  in  rhe  Federal
17 Findings  are  consistent  with  results
Duca  (1991)  finds  that  auto  lending  shifred
companies  when  banks  became  less  willing  to
finds  cross-section  evidence  that  liquidity
shown later  and  two  studies,
fron  banks  toward  finance
make consumer loans.  Lan  (1991)
constraints  affect  auto  sales.!9
Reserwe  Board's  (FRB) econometric model.
auto  and  nonauto  durable  spending  and  the
services  and nondurables  plus  the  service
Effects  on  Consu[rer Durables
Two are  error-correction  nodels  of
third  rnodels consumer spending  on
flow  from  the  stock  of  durables.
and
The  FRB durable  equations  are  of  the  form:
i./k,-,-aEC.-,+BAx., (17)
where  i  =  durable  purchases  and leases  ninus  depreciation,  EC.-, =  the  error-
correction  term,  and X =  a vector  of  variables  having  short-run  dJmarnic
effects.  The dependent  varlable  irl  the  auto  rnodel is  household  purchases  and
leases  of  autos  divided  by  the  lagged  stock  minus  a  constant  (.17493)  and a
tine  trend  (l0.398rztine).  The dependent  wariable  in  the  nonautos  model  equals
purchases  of  nonautos  diwided  by  the  lagged  stoek  (there  ls  no  tlme  trend).
In  the  EC terms  beloTr,  the  first  tern  controls  for  permanent  income  (con),  the





where "a"  ("o")  superscripts  denote auto  (nonauto) wariables,  CON  = consumer
purchases  of  servlces  and nondurables  plus  the  imputed  servlce  flolr  froro  the
stock  of  durables,  r"  = real  after-Lax  interest  rate  for  autos  adjusted  for
relative  prices,  ro =  real  after-tax  interest  rate  for  nonauto  durables,  Ps."  =
price  of  gasoline,  P"on  =  consuuption  price  deflator,  MPG  =  fuel  efficiency  of
the  existing  auto  stock,  and Po  =  price  deflator  for  nonauto  durables.
For  autos  and nonautos,  x  includes  Arr  and  the  one-quafter  lags  of
disposable  income growth  (Ayd) and  the  dependent  variable.  For  autos,  x  also20
includes  the  percent  change  in  the  real  price  of  gas  per  nile  driven
[Ps8/Poi*MPC],  and  the  two-quarter  lag  of  the  dependent  variable.
Of  the  models  ineluding  CR,  the  nost  successful  in  terms  of  fit  and
perfornancele  of  the  EC specification  were  of  the  forn:
i,/k"_,  :  [oo + olcR]Ecr_l  + p^xt, (20)
where  ao  is  a  constan!  and  a1  is  hypothesized  to  be  positive  because  increases
in  credit  availability  (CR>O)  theoretically  could  increase  the  responsiveness
of  purchases  to  the  tap  between  desired  and  actual  durable  stoeks.  Since  the
speed  of  error  correction  is  more  a  function  of  the  Ievel  rather  than  the
percent  change  in  credit  availability  (CR),  other  runs  also  included  lags  of
CR interacted  with  EC.-,.  Giwen  the  big  spikes  in  CR around  the  credit  control
episode,  some models  also  include  the  credit  control  dunny,  CONTROL,
intetacted  with  the  EC term  to  see  lf  the  credit  control  episode  can  bias  the
nornal  dynamic  effect  of  CR on  the  speed  of  error-correction.
CR has  significant,  positive  effects  on  the  speed  of  adjustnent  whether
contemporaneous  or  lagged  CR is  intefacted  vrlth  the  EC tern  (table  5).  For
both  durables,  the  one-quarter  lag  of  CR has  the  largest  effect,  and  x0ore so
when  the  significant  credit  control  durnrny  is  present.  Consistent  with  these
results,  both  FRB models  fit  better  when  CR is  included  as  a  determinant  of
the  speed  of  correction.  In  addition,  including  CR in  the  nonauto  durable
model  allor^rs  one  to  not  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  residuals  are
well-behaved.  Based  on  fit  and  t-statistics,  models  3  and  6  are  the  preferred
speciflcations  for  auto  and  nonauto  durables,  respectively.
'8In ocher runs,  separate
estimated  EC coefficients  rqere
Iags  of  CR  were  very  signifi-cant,  but  the
insignificant  and R"s  were  lorrer.2!
Ex post  forecasts  of  the  levels  of  auto  and nonauto  durables  frorn  the
fRB models hawe S.S.E.'s  rrhich are  408* and 144* higher  than  those derived
from models 3 and 6,  respectively,  over  the  post-Reg Q era  (1983:4-94:4).le
Unlike  the  FRB auto  rnodel,  model  3  did  not  incorrectly  predict  a  sharp  decline
in  auto purchases over  the  1988-90 period  of  rising  interest  rates,  did  not
incorrectly  forecast  a  sharp  recovery  during  Che subsequent  period  of
declining  interest  rates  over  1990-93 (Figure  2),'zo  and does a respectable  job
of  sinulating  auto  spending  out-of-sample  over  a  12-year  period.  One
plausible  explanation  is  that  the  FRB  rnodel is  affected  by  bias  from  omitting
the  credit  awailability  index  that  lead  it  to  overestimate  the  effect  of
higher  interest  rates  on autos  in  the  post-Reg  Q era.  Tn particular,  credit
awailability,  as measured by  CR, declined  much less  during  1988-90  run-up  in
interest  rates  than  in  preceding  periods  of  Fed tightening.  Additionally,  CR
did  not  surge  as  nuch  as  in  prior  periods  of  Fed easing  during  the  1990-92
fall-off  in  interest  rates  beeause prior  increases  in  the  federal  funds  rate
in  the  late-1980s  did  not  lead  to  Reg-Q induced  dis intermediation  thar  was
Iater  unwound by  the  subsequent  rate  cuts  in  the  early-1990s.
credit  Avaitability  Effects  on  trCON"
The variable  "CON" plays  a  critical  role  in  the  FRB  model  of  the  U.S.
economy because  it  proxies  fof  peruanent  income and measures consumption  in  a
way consistent  with  the  LCHIPIH.  The lRB model  of  "CON" is:
le While  the  CR-augnented  uodel  of  nonauto  durables  also  outperforms  the
FRB nodel  in  ex  post  forecasts,  the  difference  is  not  as  striklng  as  in  the
case  of  autos.  This  rnay owe  to  improvements  in  computers  that  make  it
difficult  to  track  nonauto  durable  dernand well  ou!-of-sample  and  to  the  fact
that  because  nonauto  durable  itens  are  less  expensiwe  than  new  cars,  nonauto
durable  purchases  are  relatiwely  less  dependent  on  obtaining  financing.
?0 Figure  2  plots  forecasted  levels  of  real  auto  durable  purchases  thau





















































































CON. -  li=e,  ra._iyr._i*  5i-0,rp._iyt't_1+ ti=0.36r_1yp"_r*  ?w". +  OT,e"r+  roll-r, (20)
where  CON, the  w's  and  the  y's  are  per  capitar  yr=after-tax  labor  income
(instrumented  using  Lags of  yt  and the  real  federal  funds  rate),  y"  =  transfer
incone,  yp=after-tax  property  income,  I,rs  (w")-the  six-quarter  moving  average  of
stock  market  (other)  wealth  deflated  by  P"",  and OIL =  L974 oLL shock  dumrny.
Since  CR has  a rnean near  zero,  CR  nay  temporarily  affect  savings.  As  a
test,  a set  of  variables  interacting  CR,  1  with  yI.-i were added to  eq.  (20).
These terms  are  jointly  significant  with  a positive  sum of  coefficients  and
residuals  are  better  behaved  in  their  presence  regardless  of  whether  jointly
insignificant  terms  interacting  yl.,i  with  a  credit  control  duumy are  present
(cable  6).  These results  suggest  that  loosening  nonrate  credit  terns  boosts
consumet spending  by  temporarily  lowering  the  savings  rate.
Nevertheless,  the  interactive  terms  have  a  smaller  effect  on nodel  fit
and are  less  significant  in  the  "CON" models  than  in  the  the  two  durable
models.  These differences  plausibly  reflect  that  "CON"  includes:  (1)  non-
durable  purchases  which  are  much less  credit  intenslve  than  durable  purchases,
and  (2)  the  imputed  service  floru  from  che stock  of  durables  which  is  more
stable  and less  affected  by  credit  conditions  than  are  ourchases  of  durables.
5.  Conc  lus Lon
This  study  finds  that  bank  consumer lending  reflects  not  only  demand
factors  and supply  influences  related  to  interest  rates,  taxes,  and nonbank
conpecition,  but  also  nonrate  credit  conditions.  In  addition,  a proxy  for
nonrate  credit  conditions  is  found  to  have  significant  effects  on consumer
durable  spending,  These results  are  conslstent  wlth  eross-section  ewidence
that  borrowing  constraints  have  large  effects  on households  [e.g.,  Duca and
Rosenthal  (1993),  Jappelfi  (1990),  and Cox and Jappelli  (L992)l  and wirhz3
theoretical  nodels  that  bank credit  is  alloeated  qrith nonrate  terms  (e.g.,
Jaffee  and Russell  (1976),  Stiglitz  and lJeiss  (1981),  and l,Iilliarnson  (1986)),
as well  as  rates.  Ewidence also  sholrs that  bank  willingness  to  make consumer
Ioans  is  decreasing  in  the  real  federal  funds  rate  and positively  related  to  a
leading  indicator  of  better  uacroeconomic  conditions.  These two  findings  are
consistent  with  a nodified  Stiglitz  and lJeiss  (1981, part  IV)  sereening model,
a view  that  credit  availabllity  is  partly  endogenous,  and with  the  continued
use  of  credit  standards  by  banks  in  evaluating  loan  applications.  Overall,
the  results  inply  that,  in  addition  to  working  through  interest  rate  and
income channels,  nonetary  policy  influences  bank  consuner  lending  and consumer
durable  purchases  by  affecting  nonrate  credit  conditions.  Findings  also  have
two  other  inportant  implications  for  monetary  policy.  First,  the  impact  of
federal  funds  rate  changes on  the  willingness  to  lend  index  is  smaller  after
the  1970s  in  rnodels onitting  a Reg Q wariable  and uodels  with  such  a variable
irnply  that  deposit  deregulation  has  expanded credit  availability.  Second,  the
onisslon  of  the  lending  index  likely  creates  an upr{ard bias  to  the  post-1970s
inpact  of  nonetary  policy,  consistent  with  the  fact  that  the  FRB model  of
consumer durables  severely  underpredicts  consumer durables  in  the  late-1980s,
while  a model  including  the  credit  availability  index  as  a  determinant  of
stock  adjustment  does not  (Figure  *).  Together,  these  findings  inply  that
deposit  deregulation  has  reduced  the  impact  of  interest  rates  on consumer
credit  availability  and are  consistent  with  the  position  of  Miron,  Romer,  and
Weil  (1995)  that  the  relative  strength  of  the  bank  credit  channel  of  monetary
policy  has declined  ower time.24
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Table 1:  Granger Causality  Results
Direction
CR  _>  DUR
cR  ->  AlD
CR  -)  Aleb
CR  ->  ARFF
cR  ->  cM22










DUR  _>  CR
Al'  ->  cR
Aleb -)  cR
ARFF  ->  CR







CR  ->  APAPERBILL  1. 98 APAPERBILL  _> CR  L.7 6
CR  ->  AYCURVE
RFF ->  GM22
CR  .>  GLT
AYCURVE  ->  CR
GM22  ->  RFF




A1l  tests  include  a  durnny for  the  inposition  and  lifting  of  credit  eontrols  in
1980  (CONTROL)  and  are  based  on  4lags  with  samples  over  1968:Q1-94:Q4,  except
for  dleD where  data  are  awailable  for  1968:Q1-82:Q4  sample  period.
.->  denotes  test  of  causality  fron  the  left-hand  side  wariable  to  the  ridhr-
hand  side  variable.
'(")  denotes  significant  at  the  5t  (1*)  Ievel.
Variable  Definitions:
CR  =  index  of  relative  change  in  bank  willingness  to  rnake





=  percent  change in  real  bank  consumer loan  outstandings.
=  percent  change in  real  bank  consumer installrnent  loan  extensions.
=  first  difference  of  the  federal  funds  rate  ninus  the  annualized  2-
quarter  growth  rate  of  PCE  deflator.
=  2 quarter  gror,Tth  rate  of  real  M2.
APAPERBILL  =  first  difference  of  the  spread  between  the  4-6  month prime
commercial  paper  rate  and the  5 rnonth Treasury  bill  rate.
AYCURVE  =  first  difference  of  the  spread  between  the  l0  year  Treasury
note  and  3 month Treasury  bill  rate.
=  L  quarter  percent  change  in  the  index  of  leading  economic
indicators.
GLI28
Resulrs  of  Modeling an#"":t;"tr.nk  wirlingness  to  Lend




























































(2  .  e5)
4.71..
(3  .7  5)
(5.71)
























R,  .810  .797  .805
rho  .690  .653  .7O7
D.rd.  1.8s  1,.90  L.93
Q(24)  23.87  L9.45  23.20
'(")--significant  at  the  5t  (1-*)  1eve1.
.815  .820  .823
.116  .684  .686
1.  90  t.93  l-.88
20.44  2t.L5  22.83
t-ratios  are  in  parentheses.
variable  Definitions:
ARFF  =  first  difference  of  the  real  federal  funds  rate.
CIl22  =  2  quarter  growth  rate  of  real  M2.
APAPERBILL  =  A of  4-6  mon. commercial  paper  rate  minus  6 rnonth T-bill  rate.
AYCURVE  = A  of  the  10-vr.  Treasurv  note-3  month T-bill  soread.
=  2  qtr.  pereent  change in  the  index  of  leading  economic
indicators.
REGQ  = measure of  bindingness  of  regulation  Q ceilings.
CONTROL  = credit  control  dunrny  :  1 1n 1980:2 and -1  in  1980:3.
MMDA  =  duxnny  equal  to  L  in  1-982:Q4  when MMDAs  were  introduced.29
Table  3:  Impact  of  Excluding  Reg Q Measures on
Estimated  Coefficients  on Monetary  Policy  Measures
(full  sarnple, L967  :L-94:4)
s Abs.  Change  in
Monetary  Models  Models  Monetary  Coeff.
Variable  ruith  REGO  without  REGO  Fron  Droppine  REGQ
ARFFE  -2.42"  -3.78"  -36*












(-3  .37  )
6  .38"
(4  .67  t
-32?
-252























with  REGO  vrithout  REGo
1.  T'trese  tests  add an  interactive  dunmy variable  to  each nodel  using  one
monetary  poli.cy  measure,  where  the  i.nteractive  variable  equals  the  product  of
that  monetary  policy  variable  and a  durnmy  equal  to  one after  1978:Q4.  The
models  correspond  to  rnodels 1-4  fron  table  2,  with  and rnrichouu  REGQ,  as  noted.
'(")--significant  at  the  5t  (18)  level.  t-ratios  are  in  parentheses.
Variable  Definitions:
ARFF  -  first  difference  of  the  real  federal  funds  rate.
AM22  =  2 quarter  gror{th  rate  of  real  M2.
APAPERBILL  =  A of  4-6  non.  corumercial  paper  rate  minus  6 roonth T-bill  rate.
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- .  0007
(-0.66)
0  .  0004
(0.s5)










- .  0008
(-0.86)
0.  003  5
(0.68)
- .oo7  4"
(-2.ee)
30
Real  Bank  Consumer Loan
Model  3  Model  4
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(3.6s)  (4.  0s  )
0.2529-  0.2s74"
(2.48)  (2.82)









Model  5  Model  6
-.3403""  -. 32  51..







0.4386'.  0  .4369"
(3.63)  (4.04)
0.2545"  0  .2584"









R:  .83s6  .87ss
D.H.  0.0085  -2.4568-'
s.s.E.  .00380  .00320
Q(24)  20  .3r  l-7  .  00
.8631  .8902  .8634  .8903
-o.6L96  -0.9549  -0.6188  1.  1001
.00352  .00280  .00351  .  o027I
t-8.85  L3.44  18.71  L3.34
88:L-94:4
Forecast
s.  s.  E.  .00170  .001-s6  .00133  .00L22  .00132  .00121
'(")--significant  at  the  5t  (1-t) 1evel.  t-ratios  are  in  parentheses.
Variable  Definitions:
EC  =  error  correction  term  for  bank  loan  outstandings.
CR  =  index  of  change in  bank willingness  to  nake  consumer l"oans,
Lb  =  real  stock  of  U.S.  bank  consumer loans,  securi  t-i-zaxion  adjusted.
CON  = proxy  for  peruanent  income.
DUM802 =  credit  control  dumrny  :  I  in  1980:Q2.
CON  = MPS  rnodel's  proxy  for  permanent  income.
SPREAD =  finance  conpany auto  loan  rate  minus  bank  auto  loan  rate,  new cars.
t  = real.  after-tax  auuo loan  rate.
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(-1.  e0)



































rho  .9267  4
D.W.  L.75
s.  s.  E.  .II37  6
-(--)--significant  at  the  5g (1*)  level.
Variable  Definitions:
CON  = MPS  model's  proxy  for  permanent
yt  =  real  labor  income.
y"  =  real  income from  transfers.
yp  = after-tax  property  income (e.g.
ws  =  the  six-quarter  noving  average
d'  =  the  six-quarter  movlnB  average
OIL  =  1974  oLL  shock  duxony.
,  dividends,  interes!,  and rent).
of  real  stock  narket  wealth.











are  in  parenuheses.33
List  of  Variable  Definitions  (Not  intended  for  publication)
Ei  =  expected  loan  revenue  from  household  i,
qt  = expected loan  quality  of  household i.
d1  =  expected  default  rate  of  household  i.
y'  =  underlying  incone  potential  of  household  i.
6,  i  = real,  riskless  cost  of  funds  to  banks.
P  =  positive  indicator  of  the  rnacroeconomic outlook.
f  =  notional  loan  dernand.
L'  =  average  per  capita  dernand  for  real  consumer loans  from  all  lenders.
Lb  = real  stock  of  U.S.  bank consumet 1oans, securitization  adjusted.
so  = bank  share  of  total  consumer loans.
a  =  population  share  tha!  qualifies  for  a  loan  and botrows.
N  = population.
C  =  real  personal  consumption  expenditures.
r  =  real,  tax-adjusted  bank  auto  loan  rate.
tr"  =  expectations  of  inflation.
R  =  nominal  bank  auto  loan  rate  (source:  Federal  Reserve  surveys)
t  =  rnarginal  federal  income tax  rate  for  a proto-t)rpical  fanily  of  four.
o  =  cutrent  share  of  consumer loan  interest  that  is  tax  deductible,
O  =  4-year  ahead share  consumer loan  intetest  that  is  tax  deductible,
DUR  =  real  consumer durable  spending  growth  ($  1987).
cR  =  index  of  change in  bank  willingness  to  make consumer loans.
A  =  first  difference  operator.
Al"  =  percent  change in  real  bank  consumer loan  outstandlngs.
AIeb  =  percent  change in  real  bank  consuuer  installment  loan  extensions.
ARFF  =  first  difference  of  the  real  federal  funds  rate.
GM22  =  2 quarter  growth  rate  of  real  M2.
A?APERBILL  =  A of  4-6  rnon. cornmercial  paper  rate  ninus  6 nonth  T-bill  rate.
AYCURVE  =  A  of  che  10-yr.  Treasury  note-3  month T-bill  spread.
CLI  =  1 qtr.  percent  change in  the  index  of  leading  economic  indicators.
GLI2  =  2 qtr.  percent  change in  the  index  of  leading  economlc  indicators.
REGQ  = neasure  of  bindingness  of  regulatlon  Q ceilings.
CoNTROL  =  credit  control  durnroy  -  1  in  1980:2  and -l  in  1,980:3.
MMDA  =  dunny equal  to  1  in  1982:Q4 when MMDAs  were  introduced.
EC  =  appropriate  error  correction  terms  fot  various  models.
DUM802 =  credit  control  dunny :  1  in  1980:Q2.
CON  = MPS  rnodel's  proxy  for  permanent  income.
SPREAD =  finance  company auto  loan  rate  minus  bank  auto  loan  rate,  new cars.
r  -  real,  after-tax  auto  loan  rate.
U  =  ciwllian  unemploynent  rate.
L/k  =  depreciation  adjusted  durable  spending  divided  by  the  durable  stock.
r'  (r')  = user  cost  of  capital  for  auto  (nonauto)  durables,  depreciation  adj.
yu  = real  disposable  income.
[Pg4/P@"*MPG]  =  real  prlce  of  gasoline  per  car  rniLe driven.
Psas  =  nominal  price  index  for  gasoline.
= price  deflator  for  CoN, the  MPS  model's  measure of  permanent  incorne.
MPC  =  gas rnileage  adjustnent  for  calculating  the  real  price  of  gasollne
Per caf  ml-.Le  ollven.
yt  =  real  labor  ineome.
=  real  income  from  transfers.
yn  = after-tax  property  incorne (e.g.,  dividends,  interest,  and rent).
w"  =  the  six-quarter  noving  average  of  real  stock  market  wealth.
!r'  =  the  six-quarter  moving  average  of  real  494-stock  narket  wealth.
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